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This paper examines to what extent Eastern Europe trade reorientation towards
the West has been driven by market forces versus policies for regional integra-
tion. Hierarchical cluster analysis based on bilateral trade intensity reveals the
convergence of regional trade structures to the pre-World-War II pattern. Esti-
mates of the expected trade pattern of Eastern Europe with a gravity model pre-
dict continuing rising importance of the EU. Furthermore, the assessment of the
welfare implications of preferential access to EU markets shows that beneficial
effects of trade expansion are likely to outweigh possible distortions. Hence inte-
gration policies follow the facts created by the market.
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The transformation of the Central and Eastern European economies has elimi-
nated the preference for intra-COMECON trade and many barriers to trade be-
tween Eastern and Western Europe.* As a result, Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs) have reoriented their foreign trade towards Western Europe.
Simultaneously, the institutional integration between the EU and Eastern Europe
may also have driven the process of reorientation. The purpose of this research is
to investigate whether this process has been primarily driven by market forces or
institutional integration. The focus is on the following countries: Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic.
First, I examine the occurred regional regrouping of countries within Europe by
using hierarchical cluster analysis and dendrograms (tree diagrams) to identify
functional regions characterised by the intensity of bilateral trade. This statistical
approach reveals profound changes in trade orientation of the CEECs from East
towards the West since 1989 and allows a comparison with trade orientation be-
fore World War II.
Second, an estimate of the ,,normal" regional pattern of trade of the CEECs is
determined with a gravity model that expresses bilateral trade as a function of
economic size of the countries (as a proxy of trade promoting factors) and the
distance between them (as a proxy of trade restricting factors).
Third, different indices are applied to ascertain whether EU membership of the
CEECs would have distortionary trade effects. The analysis reveals that trade in-
This paper on the trade integration between Eastern and Western Europe is part of the
project ..Perspectives for the Division of Labour between Germany and Eastern Europe".
Financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Special
thanks are due to Rolf J. Langhammer and Matthias Liicke for helpful suggestions and to
Dieter Schumacher from the German Institute of Economic Research in Berlin for provid-
ing data on distance between countries used in the gravity model. Angela Husfeld and
Michela Rank provided excellent research assistance.tegration between Eastern and Western Europe has already progressed so far that
regional integration due to political reasoning will not cause substantial trade
distortions. Politics will only give an institutionalised framework to trade struc-
tures created by dynamic market activities. Therefore, it can be concluded that
the political plans about the integration of the European nations are only late arri-
vals to the reality of economic integration based on trade flows.
II. Trade Reorientation of the CEECs Since 1989
//./. The Geographical Composition ofCEEC Trade
The year 1989 brought the artificial trade isolation of Central and Eastern Europe
from Western Europe to an end. Since then, trade barriers have been dismantled
(not completely yet) and East-West trade has increased dramatically. There has
been a distinct regional shift of the trade of the CEECs to Western Europe as re-
vealed in the trade statistics. This shift is also due to the collapse of trade be-
tween the CEECs since the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
disintegrated and the decreasing GNP level during the early period of transforma-
tion reduced import demand for goods.
The geographical composition of export flows of the CEECs is listed in Table 1
for three years: 1928 as representative of the pre World War II period, 1989 as
representative of the time of the Iron Curtain and 1994 as the most current year
with available data.
1 In 1989, the share of the 15 countries of the EU in the total
trade of the CEECs was only 23 percent. In the same year the countries of the
Eastern bloc were the important purchasers of goods and services of the CEECs,
with the Soviet Union as the most important trading partner. This had changed
drastically by 1994. The Soviet Union vanished as the main destination of the
1 The geographical composition of the import flows of the CEECs is generally similar to that
of the export flows. Import flows for the three years are presented in Appendix Table 1.CEECs products. The succeeding 15 republics have attracted only a fraction of
the former trade flows. For each Eastern European country, the other CEECs also
lost in importance.
As a point of reference for the present trading pattern, a suitable historical
trading pattern can shed light on the extent of the occurred changes. The trading
pattern of the CEECs before World War II mirrors cultural affinity with the
Western European Countries as all CEECs were characterised by market
economies. Only the USSR followed a planned economy system. CEEC trade
before World War II was subject to many of the same determinants as today:
differences in natural resource and factor endowments, production complemen-
tarities, cultural and language links and geographical proximity.
2 However, the
time before World War II was not distortion-free and a comparison to the eighties
and nineties requires caution. In the twenties and thirties, the Soviet Union still
suffered from the effects of the civil war and was isolated from the other coun-
tries. The borders of the Soviet Union, Poland and Germany have changed in the
wake of World War II. Furthermore, the relative strength of Western countries
has changed over the decades, most noticeable for the UK and Japan. Given these
qualifications, the year 1928 was selected for a snapshot of trading before the
Great Depression of 1933.
Table 1 shows that there is an astonishing correlation in the geographical com-
position of trade of the CEECs between the year 1928 and 1994. In 1994 as in
1928, the 15 countries of the EU accounted for two thirds of the exports of the six
CEECs. The extent of the reorientation to the pre World War II pattern varies for
2 Collins and Rodrik (1991) combine trade data from the pre World War II period and a re-
gression on comparator countries to derive an estimation of the potential geographical
composition of trade of the CEECs. Some of the following discussion and tables draw on
ideas and data from Collins and Rodrik. Laaser and Schrader (1992) also use the inter-war
period as a bench-mark case to assess the integration prospects of the Baltic States into the
global economic system.the different Eastern European countries, but the overall conclusion for the
CEECs is the same.
112. Reshaping of Functional Regions in Europe
The reorientation of CEEC trade as described in the preceding section has re-
shaped the regional trading patterns in Europe. In this context, regions are defined
to include countries whose trade links to other members of the group are stronger
than their links to non-members. In regional science, this is described as the con-
cept of functional regions.
3 Regions matter since their configuration often deter-
mines the political decision making. The relative intensity of bilateral merchan-
dise trade reflects the degree of the mutual dependence of the goods markets and
can be used as a criterion for the identification of regions.
A suitable measure for trade intensity is the share of country i's exports des-
tined to country j, Xjj / X^ with Xy as country i's exports to country j and Xj as
country i's total exports. The trading relationship between two countries is char-
acterised by two values: (Xjj / Xj) and (Xjj / Xj), of which the minimum is chosen
3 This differs from the concept of a homogenous regions. Areas or countries constitute a ho-
mogeneous region if they reveal a high degree of similarity concerning a set of characteris-
tics, like natural resource endowments, climate, topography or GNP per capita. For a dis-
cussion of these concepts see Amelung (1992). Different methodologies to measure bilateral






















































































































































































Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ex-Soviet Union and Ex-Yugoslavia.
Asia: Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Burma, Sri Lanka.
'EU (15): without Ireland; -

































































Sources: Collins and Rodrik (1991) and International Monetary Fund (1995).to represent the relationship. A high value means that bilateral trade influences
the allocation of resources in both economies (Amelung, 1992).
4
A hierarchical cluster analysis can be used to identify regions based on the in-
tensity of bilateral trade links. The first step of hierarchical cluster analysis is the
calculation of the similarity matrix" which gives the values of (Xy / Xj) and
(Xp / Xj), labelled ajj and ap ; for each pair of countries.
The second step links the countries into ,,clusters" or ,,strong components"
through a single-linkage algorithm.
5 The procedure starts by linking the countries
with the largest a;j or aj; value. A threshold t for min(aij, ajO is progressively re-
duced and a link between countries is inserted when both values aij and ajj are
larger than t. With decreasing t, a cluster of countries will be linked to single
countries or other clusters until all countries are united into one cluster. It is im-
portant to note that the similarity of groups is determined only by their closest
members.
The results of the hierarchical cluster analysis of bilateral trade flows for 1929,
1984 and 1994 are described by Dendrograms (tree diagrams) (Figures 1 to 3). At
the x-axis, the magnitude of the threshold value t is depicted. Additionally, the
pairs of countries that lead to links between existing clusters are listed below the
dendrograms. In 1984, three functional regions could be identified within Europe:
First, five members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (East
4 Implicit in this approach is a bias against smaller countries because the export shares are
unweighted. Kojima (1964) developed an alternative index by normalising with the share of
the importing country world imports. However, this introduces a bias against large coun-
tries. Kojima's procedure is set out and applied in the Appendix to facilitate the comparison
of different trade indices.
5 In their discussion of cluster analysis techniques, Seleka and Henneberry (1991) explain the
different hierarchical clustering algorithm. An alternative to the single-linkage algorithm is


























The following countries are united as strong components:
1. Belgium - Netherlands
2. Germany - Netherlands
3. Austria - Hungary
4. Germany - USA
5. France - Switzerland
6. United Kingdom - USA
7. Norway - Sweden
8. Austria - Romania
9. Japan-USA
10. Czechoslovakia - Germany
11. Austria - Poland
12. Denmark - Germany
13. Germany-USSR
14. Finland - Sweden
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The following countries are united as strong components:
1. Japan - USA
2. France - Italy
3. Czechoslovakia - USSR
4. Netherlands - United Kingdom
5. W. Germany - Netherlands
6. Bulgaria - Sweden
7. Bulgaria - USSR
8. Poland,- USSR
9. Hungary - USSR
10. Finland - Sweden
11. United Kingdom-USA
12. W. Germany - Switzerland
13. Austria - W. Germany
14. Ireland - United Kingdom
15. Sweden - United Kingdom
16. Finland-USSR
17. France - Spain
18. Poland - Romania
19. Portugal - Spain
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The following countries are united as strong components:
1. Japan - USA 7. Austria - Germany
2. France - United Kingdom
3. France- Italy
4. Belgium-Lux. - France
5. France - Spain
6. Denmark - Sweden
8. Germany - Switzerland
9. United Kingdom - USA
10. Finland - Sweden
11. Ireland - United Kingdom
12. Austria - Hunaarv
13. Finland-CIS
14. Czech Rep. - Poland
15. Austria - Czech Rep.
16. Sweden - United Kingdom
17. Greece - Italy
18. Butaaria - Romania10
Germany, USSR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary),
6 second, the
four Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland and the EC-member
Denmark), third, the core members of the EC (Benelux, the UK, Italy, France and
West Germany). Japan, the USA and Canada are linked to the functional bloc of
the Western European countries before a link is established between Western and
Northern Europe or between Western and Eastern Europe. The USA and Canada
are very closely linked and can serve as a point of reference for functional regions
in Europe.
The shape of the dendrogram from 1994 shows the effects of the break-down of
trade between the Eastern European countries. The functional region of Eastern
Europe - clearly apparent in the dendrogram from 1984 - has disintegrated. While
the Czech and the Slovak Republic are of course closely linked, these two coun-
tries, Poland and Hungary join the extended functional bloc of Western European
countries at a low level of economic integration. Russia is first linked to Finland
rather than to another CEEC.
The core EU members are still closely integrated, and are linked to Spain, Por-
tugal, Austria, Switzerland, USA, Canada, Japan and Ireland before any of the
Eastern European or Scandinavian countries. Sweden, Norway, Finland and
Denmark constitute a distinct Scandinavian functional region and are linked to the
Western Europe bloc only after the Eastern European countries.
The situation in 1929 broadly resembles that of 1994. A core region consists of
France, Belgium-Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Germany, and a larger region
includes this core region, Switzerland, Italy, the UK, the USA, Canada and Ja-
pan. Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania are linked to this functional
6 The similarity matrix is calculated by dividing the elements of row i of the trade matrix
with the total exports of country i given in the last column. The similarity matrix shows
therefore the share of bilateral trade in total trade. The trade matrices and similarity matrices
for 1984 and 1994 and the similarity matrix for 1929 are supplied in the Appendix Tables.
Romania is not part of this functional region and joins in only at a low value of t - represent-
ing a weak functional integration - through the linkage with Poland.11
region before the Scandinavian countries. In 1929, the Scandinavian functional
region included Denmark, Sweden and Norway, but not Finland. Thus, the den-
drograms reveal a convergence of the pattern of functional regions within today's
Europe to the one which held for Europe before World War II. The dendrogram
of 1984 differs through the pronounced existence of a functional region of the
Eastern European countries from the dendrograms of 1929 and 1994. Hierarchical
cluster analysis therefore exposes the renaissance of the old functional regions
within Europe.
III. Expected Long-Term Pattern of Trade of the CEECs
The trading pattern of the pre-World War II period provides a useful point of ref-
erence for intra-European trade under market economy conditions, but given
substantial differences in political mapping between the two periods such com-
parison should not be overinterpreted. A gravity model - based on current eco-
nomic data - can better approximate the expected or normal" pattern of trade of
the CEECs once the adjustment problems of the transformation period have been
overcome.
///./. Estimates Based on a Gravity Model
The gravity model
7 explains bilateral trade as a function of the "size" of the two
countries and "distance". "Size" is reflected in the national product and GNP per
capita of both the supplier country and of the destination country and captures
7 The model derives its name from the analogy of trade flows to gravitational forces between
objects depending on their mass and the distance between them. Gravity models were de-
veloped in the early 1960s as a framework for the empirical analysis of trade phenomena
(Tinbergen, 1962; Poyhonen, 1963; Linnemann, 1966). Although the theoretical foundation
of the gravity model were sometimes called into question, its robustness and high explana-
tion power in empirical applications are undisputed (c.f. Deardorff, 1984). Recently, Dear-
dorff (1995) showed that even a simple gravity equation can be derived from standard trade
theories. Gravity models have been widely used to test a host of hypotheses and have not
lost their attraction over the decades (c.f. Langhammer, 1989; Havrylyshyn and Pritchett,
1991; Gros and Dautrebande, 1992; Winters and Wang, 1994 and Frankel, Stein and Wei,
1995).12
supply potential and absorptive capacity. "Distance" captures all factors that re-
strict (or stimulate) trade by increasing (or reducing) transaction costs of trade
between the two countries. Trading restricting factors include transport costs and
protectionist measures; trade stimulating factors include regional preference
zones, a common border, a common language, cultural similarities and historical
links.
Our estimates of the potential trade of the CEECs are based on recent work by
Schumacher (1995a). Schumacher's coefficient estimates are derived from bilat-
eral trade data among 22 OECD countries and between the 22 OECD countries
and 48 additional partner countries.
8 The coefficient estimates are then combined
with the explanatory variables of the CEECs to derive the expected "normal"
trade flows between the CEECs and all partner countries. Besides GNP and geo-
graphical distance, Schumacher's full model includes various regression variables
like a shared language, colonial ties, membership of a preference zone and a
common border. Schumacher concludes, however, that these variables provide
little additional explanatory power. His preferred regression includes only na-
tional product, per capita income and geographical distance.
For the exports of OECD countries, the following equation is derived:
Y Y-
In X w =-13.07+ 0.92 In Y: + 0.38 In-^- + 0.79 In Y: + 0.17 In-±-0.89 In D:;
y • P j p y
For the imports of OECD countries, the corresponding equation is:
Y Y-
lnX;; = -13.14 + 1.00In Y; + 0.181n—i- +1.20InY; -0.24In-^--0.90InD;:
y • p J p y
n
 rj
8 The coefficients of the equation are derived with the OLS estimation procedure. To obtain
consistent estimates, observations with zero values are replaced by very small figures. Since
the data are based on the trade of the OECD countries with partner countries there are only
few observations with zero value and the OLS estimation is an appropriate procedure.
Apart from the estimates of the coefficients for total trade reported in this section, Schu-
macher also estimates the coefficients for trade in goods of the manufacturing sector as a
whole and of individual branches of the manufacturing sector.with:
13 Bl&liofhek
dies Institute fur Weitwirfsef
Xtj Exports from country i to country j
Yt GNP of supplier country i
Pi Population of supplier country i
Yj GNP of destination country j
Pj Population of destination country j
Dy Distance in miles between the economic centre of country i and j
All estimated coefficients except for Yj / Pj in the import equation are signifi-
cant at the 99 per cent level.
9 They confirm the analogy to the gravitational law of
physics: Exports or imports between two countries are larger, the higher their na-
tional products and the smaller the distance between them. A higher level of per
capita income results also in higher bilateral trade flows (c.f. Schumacher,
1995a). The negative coefficient on Yj/ Pj in the import equation may reflect col-
linearity between total and per capita income (the coefficient on total GNP is
greater than unity).
Table 2 reports the resulting estimates of the expected long-term trade pattern
of the CEECs. It is important to note that Schumacher's coefficient estimates
were derived through a regression analysis of the trade of the OECD countries
with other OECD and developing countries. In using these estimates, it is as-
sumed that the trading relationships of the CEECs are determined by the same
factors of the OECD countries. Employing these coefficient estimates, long-term
equilibrium exports and imports of each CEEC in trade with 84 partner countries
9 For the export equation, R
2 is 0.82 instead of 0.84 for the equation with all variables; for
the import equation, it is 0.49 instead of R
2 = 0.50 for the equation with all variables. The
regression equation is also applied to individual countries to reflect better the characteristics
of a country in the coefficients (Schumacher, 1995a and 1995b). The explanatory power for
the regression of the trade of Germany as an individual country is very high on the export
(R
2 = 0.93) and import (R
2 = 0.84) side. For France as an individual country R
2 numbers
0.83 for the exports and R
2 numbers 0.82 for the imports. Schumacher estimates Germany's
potential trade with the CEECs with the results from the regression for the individual coun-
try's foreign trade as well as with the regression results for all the OECD countries. The es-




0 Table 2 and Appendix Table 2 list total exports and imports for
each CEEC and the shares of the main trading partner.
The analysis indicates that we should expect a continuing shift of the CEECs'
trade orientation towards the EU. As the summary columns for the 6 CEECs re-
veal, the expected EU share is on average almost 71 per cent of the total CEEC
exports and 72 per cent of total imports (Appendix Table 2). In 1994, the actual
share was almost 64 per cent exports and around 60 per cent of the imports. The
expected percentage share of Eastern Europe (consisting of the CEECs, the suc-
cessor states of the Soviet Union and Slovenia) is less than 8 per cent for CEEC
exports and less than 5 per cent for imports. In 1994, the actual shares were
around 15 per cent for the exports and almost 23 per cent of the imports.
However, some qualifications are necessary. The gravity model predicts an av-
erage share of less than 3 per cent of total CEECs' imports for the successor
states of the Soviet Union. Considering the present volume of energy imports
from the Russian Federation, this value is probably too low. The omission of an
important variable (natural resource endowment) inevitably restricts the predic-
tive power of the gravity model.
1
0 The 84 countries consist of the 70 countries used by Schumacher for his regression esti-
mates, the CEECs, the Baltic Republics, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazak-
stan and Slovenia. The regression was estimated with data on GNP per capita and popula-
tion for the years 1988 to 1990 taken from the World Bank's Development reports. To
capture the actual weight of the countries' GNP, the latest World Bank's GNP figures of
the year 1994 from the World Bank Atlas 1996 were adjusted to the price level of 1990 and
employed for the estimation of the trading pattern of the CEECs. The inflation adjustment is
necessary to maintain the relative weight of GNP and distance on bilateral trade flows. Bik-
ker (1987) stated that a gravity model will exhibit money illusion unless predictions are
made at the same prices as used in the estimations. The estimated volumes of trade are sub-
sequently ..inflated" from the price level of 1990 to the level of 1994 to facilitate the com-
parison to the actual trade of 1994. This approach will underestimate the growth of trade
potential through increased GNP. The gravity model yields the prediction of strong income
effect on trade with elasticities exceeding unity. With increased GNP in the CEECs and the
partner countries we should expect an at least proportional increase in the trading potential.
The distance between the countries was computed by Schumacher as the shortest line be-
tween their commercial centres according to the degrees of latitude and longitude. The data















































































































































































Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ex-Soviet Union and Ex-Yugoslavia.
Asia: Japan, PakistarI, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Korea, Hong Kong.
Unweighted average. -




























Sources: International Monetary Fund (1995), own calculations.16
Another qualification concerns the relative GNP level among the countries. The
estimates for the potential volume of trade are biased downwards due to the pres-
ently depressed levels of the GNP of the CEECs during the transformation pe-
riod. Schumacher (1995a) accounts for the high skill level of CEEC population by
increasing their GNP threefold, based on a regression of per capita income on
human capital in market economies. The adjustment of per capita GNP to reflect
expected income convergence especially affects the relative importance of trade
among the CEECs. We use three different scenarios to gauge the trade impact of
the CEECs' expected catching up in per capita income.
Scenario I assumes that the GNP of the Eastern European countries doubles
whereas the GNP of all other countries remains constant. Under this assumption,
the average share of CEEC exports to Eastern Europe is 14 per cent compared to
8 per cent under the assumption of current GNP levels. The 15 countries of the
EU attract 64 per cent rather than 69 per cent of CEEC exports. In Scenario II the
GNP of the Eastern European countries is tripled whereas the GNP of all other
countries is kept constant. In the final Scenario III, the GNP of the Eastern Euro-
pean countries is tripled, the GNP of the developing countries is doubled, and the
GNP of the developed countries remains constant. Scenario III models the hy-
pothesis of the global convergence. Scenarios II and in lead to very similar
shares of different regions in CEEC exports: Eastern Europe accounts for roughly
19 per cent, and the EU for 57 per cent (Scenario HI) to 60 per cent (Scenario II).
These experiments with different relative GNPs indicate that the EU will also
maintain its predominant position in trade of the CEECs in the case of a ,,rapid
catching up" of the CEECs and of the developing countries. A trebling of the
GNP requires a growth rate of 6 per cent for almost 20 years. If EU countries
continue to grow at a moderate rate of 2 per cent, say, then even higher growth
rates are required for the CEECs to close the income gap.17
Other recent studies also use gravity models to estimate the potential volume
and pattern of trade between Eastern and Western Europe (Havrylyshyn and
Pritchett, 1991; Gros and Dautrebande, 1992; Winters and Wang, 1994). Regard-
less of the selection of comparator countries and base years, these studies support
our finding that the EU will play a predominant role in CEEC trade in the long
run.
III.2. A Special Role for Trade With Germany?
One puzzling finding of the analysis in the preceding section is that the share of
Germany in CEECs exports in 1994 was substantially larger than predicted by the
gravity model. It has been suggested that special cultural and historical links be-
tween the CEECs and Germany might have led to lower transaction and informa-
tion costs for partners of these countries.
Herrmann et al. (1982) analyse the different types of communication costs and
the effects on international trade. Following the approach of Herrmann et al., the
special German position may be explained by comparatively low communication
costs. Communication costs in this context consist of the costs related to all the
activities required to send and receive information needed about products, com-
panies and markets in order to sell goods. A company that wants to export its
product to a foreign market needs information about the characteristics and pref-
erences of the target group as well as about the level competition and supply
structure in the country. This set of information has to include knowledge about
commercial customs, cultural norms and personal value systems. A high level of
cultural affinity between the home country of the exporter and the target country
will lead to lower communication costs.
It is difficult to identify communication costs that are substantially lower in
trade between the CEEC and Germany than in trade between the CEECs and
other West European countries. One possible candidate would be language barri-18
ers. German was the only ,,Western" language that could be learnt and practised
freely in Eastern Europe before 1989 because the German Democratic Republic
was a socialist country. However, no evidence is detected in a recent survey of
Hungarian exporters of manufactures (Szalavetz and Lttcke, 1996). Similarly,
special links between East German and CEEC enterprises had been severed by
1991 and cannot have contributed to the prominent role of trade with Germany in
recent years.
At least in part, the prominent position of Germany may be explained by Ger-
many serving as a country of first destination for CEEC exports ultimately des-
tined for other EU countries. Circumstancial evidence of such export marketing
patterns has been found in the survey of Szalavetz and Lttcke (1996). With intra-
EU trade fully liberalised, the distinction may have become blurred and the fig-
ures of exports to the entire EU should well represent the actual exports to the
EU.
IV. Trade Effects of EU Membership for the CEECs
The preceding sections have demonstrated that the reorientation of CEEC trade
towards Western Europe is largely due to the elimination of politically motivated
barriers to East-West trade and of the preference for trade among CMEA member
countries under the central planning system. This suggests that CEEC trade reori-
entation is essentially market-driven and represents a return to normalcy.
However, from a very early stage, market-driven trade reorientation has been
complemented by trade policy measures that promoted regional integration be-
tween the European Union and the CEECs. The Europe Agreements between the
EU and the CEECs have provided a framework for a progressive liberalisation of
industrial imports from the CEECs with the long-term option of EU membership.
The integration of the CEECs into a regional trading bloc of the size of the EU
may well influence their trade flows both with EU members and non-members.19
Customs union theory assesses the world welfare effects of a regional bloc in
terms of trade creation (through efficiency gains inside the bloc) and trade diver-
sion (efficiency loss through displacing efficient external suppliers). Besides the
static effects of economic integration that are analysed with the standard customs
union theory, dynamic effects may represent additional gains for the member
countries (c.f. Hine, 1994). Dynamic effects are defined as changes in the growth
rate following the removal of trade barriers and are based on intensified competi-
tion and economies of scale. However, empirical verifications and a framework
for the quantification of these effects are still missing. Nevertheless, the analysis
based on the static effects can act as suitable proxy for all effects of integration.
Several indicators have been suggested to assess whether countries constitute a
so-called "natural" regional grouping where trade diversion is likely to be low
compared with trade creation. A very rough, but simple and widely used rule of
thumb relates to the share of intraregional trade in the bloc's total trade prior to
integration. Following Krugman (1991a, 1991b) a group of countries with a large
share of intra-bloc trade (often referred to as a share of at least 50 per cent) is
called a natural" free trade area. The six CEECs trade on average around 60 per
cent of their exports and imports with the EU. From the perspective of the
CEECs, these countries are part of the natural grouping with the EU. However,
this rough rule of thumb is fairly vague and cannot be used from the perspective
of the EU, since the CEEC share of EU trade is less than five per cent.
IV.1. Complementarity of Trade Structure
The expectations of the CEECs about the benefits of joining the EU rest on the
hope for increased export and employment opportunities through secure unre-
stricted access to a large market.
1
1 These hopes can only be fulfilled if the
1
1 Further economic benefits of EU membership like the increased attractiveness to foreign
investors (like in the case of Spain in the second half of the eighties) are set out in Baldwin
(1995).20
CEECs offer a competitive supply in goods facing an income-elastic demand in
the EU. Furthermore, commodity complementarity between CEEC and EU sup-
ply would ensure that both groups gain from the regional arrangement and that
protectionist vested interests can be contained. Therefore, a measure of trade
complementarity can provide some indication about the odds of successful inte-
gration.





with xtj as the share of good i in total exports of country j
and mik as the share of good i in total imports of country k.
The index is zero when goods exported by country j are not imported by coun-
try k. The index is one when the commodity shares in country k's imports corre-
spond exactly to those in country j exports. The higher the index, the more likely
is an envisaged regional trading arrangement to accomplish the stimulation of
trade between the members. The index builds on the assumption that existing
trade barriers do not heavily distort the structure of trade between the countries.
Otherwise the index cannot yield a reasonable indication of the likelihood of suc-
cessful integration. A further caveat is necessary for the case of a small country
with a limited range of traded goods. If this country can sell all its exports under
more favourable terms to a large partner country, a regional free trade agreement
might be successful even though the structure of the exports of the small country
does not fit well the structure of the imports of the larger country.
The index has been calculated for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Po-
land and the Slovak Republic in relation to the EU for 1990 through 1994.
1
2 For
each bilateral relationship, two index values have been computed: one for the
complementarity of the exports of each CEEC with EU imports (Table 3) and the
1
2 Due to lack of suitable data the Michaely index could not be calculated for Romania.21
other for the complementarity of the imports of each CEEC with EU exports
(Table 4). The index values for CEEC exports and EU imports remain relatively
stable over the years except for Bulgaria with a slightly decreasing value. The
index values for CEEC imports and the EU exports increase gradually over the
years (from an already high level). With progressing transformation, the CEECs
increasingly demands sophisticated capital goods as exported by the EU.
It is interesting to compare the Eastern integration into the EU with other re-
gional integration schemes. Michaely (1996) calculated the index for several pro-
posed agreements like the extension of NAFTA to the rest of Latin America
(AFTA) and Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) as well as for existing
successful and unsuccessful arrangements at the time when they were formed.
The index values in Table 5 show a marked difference between successful and
unsuccessful trading agreements. The six founding members of the EEC had an
average trade complementarity index of 0.53, and the free trade area between
Canada and the USA an value even of 0.64. By contrast, unsuccessful arrange-
ments had much lower values, such as for LAFTA (0.22) and the Andean pact
(Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) 0.07.
The corresponding average value for the Eastern enlargement of the EU is the
order of 0.61 (as the average of 0.51 for the trade complementarity of CEECs
exports and EU imports and of 0.71 for the trade complementarity of EU exports
and CEECs imports).22
































































































































aThe Americas' free trade area is proxied by NAFTA plus the next five biggest economies, Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela.
Source: Michaely (1996).23
Thus, the complementarity of the commodity composition of CEECs and EU
trade is broadly comparable to the original EEC of 6 and the Canada-US free
trade area. However, there is the possibility of indices to be biased upwards due
to data problems since the trade statistics from important partner countries (like
the republics of the former USSR) are not included in the used COMTRADE
database. On the other hand, unrestricted access to the large EU market will al-
low the CEECs to market their limited range of export products under more fa-
vourable conditions than today. On balance, therefore, the accession of the
CEECs to the EU will provide opportunities for trade expansion and will benefit
both the CEECs and the EU.
IV.2. Is CEEC-EU Integration Harmful for Third Countries?
The commodity composition of trade prior to integration has also been used to
define a "natural" regional grouping differently as Krugman does (Kreinin and
Plummer, 1994). If the composition of trade remains largely unchanged after inte-
grating, the new economic bloc is a "natural" one. The composition of trade is
expected to remain unchanged if the ranking of a country's industries by revealed
comparative advantage (RCA) in trade with members of the proposed economic
bloc (which would tend to increase because of its preferential status) does not
differ substantially from the ranking of RCA in trade with all partners. This would
support the view of bloc formation which is not trade-diverting.
This analysis is applied here from the perspective of the CEECs.
1
3 RCA indices
are calculated for 260 commodity groups at the three-digit level of the Standard
1
3 This approach could be also applied for the existing EU countries to analyse the effects of
an eastern enlargement of the EU on their comparative advantage. However, the method of
Kreinin and Plummer is appropriate for the analysis of whether joining a regional bloc
would distort the comparative advantage of a country. Due to the small size of each of the
CEECs compared to the existing EU bloc, there will be only a relative modest influence of
the CEECs on the issue, whether the enlarged EU will be ..natural" from the perspective of
a present EU member-country.24
International Trade Classification (SITC).
1
4 For each CEEC, commodity groups
are ranked, first by their RCA values in trade with all partners, and second by
their RCA values with respect to the regional bloc that would include the CEECs
and the EU. It is assumed that the ranking of the industries by their export per-
formance indicates their ranking by the country's comparative advantage. If the
RCA ranking in regional trade differs substantially from that in total trade, bloc
formation is expected to lead to trade diversion.
Revealed comparative advantage is defined as:
X,j exports of commodity i by country j
r _ X; _ total exports by country j
1 ~ X^ ~ world exports of commodity i
Xw total world exports
with respect to all trading partners, and as
X.)-(O(E[/4.CEECJ) exports of commodity i by country j into (EU + CEECs)
„. _ ^j-ujEu^cEECs) total exports by country j into (EU + CEECs)





 + CEECs) exports into (EU + CEECs)
with respect to the proposed regional grouping, consisting of the EU and the
CEEC. An RCAj of unity implies that the share of a commodity in a country's
total exports equals the share of the commodity in total world exports. An RCAj
above 1 states that the commodity has a higher proportion in a country's export
than in its world exports and suggests that the country has a comparative advan-
tage in this product. In the following, the proposed regional bloc consisting of the
present 15 EU countries and the CEECs is termed ,,EUplus". An RCA2 above
unity implies that this commodity accounts for a larger share in the country's ex-
ports to EUplus than in the exports to all the member countries of EUplus to-
gether.
1
4 Kreinin and Plummer developed this approach for the analysis of "natural" economic blocs
within Asia. The calculations for the RCA values in trade with all partners are based on the
106 countries of the COMTRADE database.25
The similarity between the commodity rankings in terms of RCA] and RCA2 is
measured by the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (Table 6). The coefficients
have been calculated for the years 1990 to 1994, with only modest fluctuations in
the results. All CEECs have correlation coefficients above 0.65 and Bulgaria,
Poland and the Slovak Republic even above 0.75, well in excess of the critical
value of 0.5 suggested by Kreinin and Plummer. Hence, commodity composition
of intraregional trade, which would be privileged, does not differ substantially
from that of total trade. Therefore, regional integration benefiting intra-group
trade is unlikely to lead to substantial distortions. In this sense, Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic and the present 15
countries of the EU constitute a natural grouping.
Table 6 - Spearman Rank Correlations Coefficients for the CEECs Between RCAs

























1993 , 0.76 0.72 0.78 0.70 0.75
1994 0.79 0.68 0.82 0.72 0.76
t tests reveal that all estimates are significant at the 1 per cent level of probability.
Source: Own calculations.26
V. Conclusions
As a consequence of their economic transformation, the CEECs have substan-
tially redirected their foreign trade from Central and Western Europe towards
Western Europe and specially the EU. Judging by the intensity of their bilateral
trade flows, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are
already part of the economic region of Western Europe. Estimates of the expected
formal" trade patterns of the CEECs under market economy conditions suggest
that the EU may become even more important, especially to Bulgaria and Roma-
nia whose reforms lag behind the other four CEECs.
1
5
Policies for integration between the EU and the CEECs have started with the
Europe agreements providing a framework for stepwise liberalisation and are ul-
timately directed towards EU membership. Our analysis has found that third
countries' trade has little to fear from full EU liberalisation of CEECs-EU trade.
The high share of intra-regional trade in total trade, the complementarity of
trade structures in terms of CEEC exports (imports) with the EU imports
(exports) and the conformity between the RCA structure of trade with the EU on
the one hand and the world on the other suggest the existence of a .jiatural"
trading partnership including the EU and the CEECs. In this sense, integration
policies follow the facts created by the market. Although the factual economic
integration is less impressive for Bulgaria and Romania, the intensity of trade
links makes Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic al-
ready ,,natural" trading partners of the EU.
1
5 The tasks ahead for the individual CEECs (as well as the tasks accomplished) are discussed
in Aldcroft and Morewood (1995). The authors set out how Romania still suffers from the
handicap of having had the most centralised economy in Eastern Europe and how Bulgaria
still has to manage the shift from energy-intensive industries to a more diversified and pro-
ductive economy.27
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VII. Appendix
The results of the analysis presented in Section H.2. on the Reshaping of Func-
tional Regions in Europe depend on the index applied to derive the similarity ma-
trix and on the algorithm used to link the countries in the cluster analysis. This
Appendix discusses alternatives to the approaches employed in the main body of
this paper.
VII.l. An Alternative Trade Index
The so called ,,actual trade intensity index" was developed by Kojimd (1964).
The index is defined as the share of country i's exports destined to country j rela-
tive to the share of country j's imports in total world imports net of country's i
imports. The actual trade intensity index is expressed as:
with X;j as country i's exports to country j, X; as country i's total exports and
Mp Mj, Mw as the imports of countries i and j and of the world. Kojima's index
has the advantage of correcting for the size of country j. A certain ratio of Xjj to
Xj renders a higher index value, the smaller the share of country j in world im-
port.
However, this approach distorts the extent of economic integration through
trade intensity. For example, Kojima's index would indicate that Germany and
Liechtenstein are highly integrated. While it is true that the performance of the
German economy determines the economic well-being of Liechtenstein, the re-
verse is not true. Both economies are not integrated to the extent that the factor
allocation in one country affects the factor allocation of the other one and vice
versa. The interlinkage through factor allocation is an important criterion for eco-
nomic integration, though it leads to a bias against smaller countries. The values
(Xy / Xj) and (Xjj / Xj) as used in the text are more appropriate criteria for eco-31
nomic integration to ensure that bilateral trade influences the allocation of re-
sources in both economies.
Nevertheless, Kojima's actual trade intensity index has been applied to the
trade data of 1984 and 1994 to examine how the findings of Section II.2. depend
on the measure of trade intensity. With the actual trade intensity index, new
similarity matrices have been calculated from the trade matrices for the years
1984 and 1994. The resulting dendrogram of functional regions for 1984
(Appendix Figure 1) displays the Eastern Bloc and the Scandinavian bloc clearly.
However, no functional regions seem to exist that includes mainly countries of the
European Community. There are pairs of Western European countries like Ireland
and the UK, Greece and Italy, Portugal and Spain. The difference between the
two indices is most clearly disclosed in the performance of the country pair USA-
Canada. The dendrogram based on the values (Xy / Xj) and (Xjj / Xp of 1984
shows the USA and Canada linked as a functional region at a very early stage of
the cluster analysis. By contrast, Kojima's actual trade intensity index leads to a
country pair USA - Canada at a later stage, indicating a comparatively weaker
functional region. The actual trade intensity index adjusts for the size of the trad-
ing partner, but introduces a bias against large countries: Once a country's share
in world trade is large, it cannot achieve such a high Iy value in trade with an-
other country like a country could with a small share in world trade.
The comparison of the dendrograms based on the actual trade intensity index of
1984 and 1994 (Appendix Figure 2) is also characterised by the bias against large
countries. The countries of the EU with their large share in world trade join func-
tional regions relatively late compared to the smaller economies of the CEECs.
The dendrogram for 1994 still identifies a Scandinavian region, but the Eastern
European region has disintegrated. While these results are broadly in accordance
with those in the main body of the test, with the Kojima index, there is no clearly
defined West European region any longer.Appendix Figure 1:



























The following countries are united as strong components:
1. Czechoslovakia - USSR
2. East Germany - USSR
3. Hungary - USSR
4. Poland - USSR
5. Denmark - Sweden
6. Norway - Sweden
7. Finland- USSR
8. Poland - Romania
9. Austria - West Germany
10. Austria-Hungary
11. Belgium-Lux. - France
12. West Germany - Netherlands
13. France -laly
14. France-Spain
15. Sweden - United Kingdom
16. Japan-USA
17. UniedKingdom -USAAppendix Figure 2:
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The following countries are united as strong
1. Bulgaria - Romania
2. Denmark - Sweden
3. Hungary - Romania
4. Norway - Sweden
5. Austria - Hungary
6. Czech Rep. -Poland
7. Bulgaria - CIS
8. Austria - Czech Rep.
9. Finland - CIS
10. Austria - Germany
11. Greece - ttaly
12. France - Spain
13. Austria - Switzerland
14. Belgium - Lux. - France
15. France-Italy
16. Norway-United Kingdom
17. Japan - USA
18. United Kingdom - USA34
VII.2. An Alternative Hierarchical Clustering Technique
In the single-linkage algorithm, groups of countries are linked according to the
closest group members (Seleka and Henneberry, 1991). Alternatively, it is possi-
ble to view a group of countries as one entity and to recalculate the trading
shares. This approach corresponds to the centroid method used in cluster analysis
(Norusis, 1990, pp 361-362). The similarity between two clusters is defined on
the basis of the similarity between the means of the relevant variables in the two
clusters. The disadvantage of the centroid method lies in the possibility that the
value representing the similarity at which clusters are combined can actually in-
crease from one step to the next. Since clusters merged at later stages are more
dissimilar than those merged at early stages, this is an undesirable property.
For the derivation of each country's share of the exports of a newly created
cluster, the intra-bloc trade is subtracted from the sum of the exports of the coun-
tries. This centroid method has been employed for the trade data for 1984 and
1994 in combination with the values (Xy / X,) and (Xji / Xj) and with Kojima's
actual trade intensity index. If no correction is made for the size of clusters, the
centroid method leads quickly to very large entities that draw in country by coun-
try. Therefore, the centroid approach requires an adjustment like that suggested
by Kojima. The resulting dendrograms are reported in the following Appendix
figures. Corresponding to the specified disadvantage of the centroid method, the
threshold values for connecting clusters did not continuously decrease, but in-
crease for some steps. For the purpose of graphical representation, a lower
threshold value than in the previous step was substituted in these cases. For 1984
as well as 1994, the dendrograms demonstrate the existence of an ,,Eastern
Bloc". However, the bloc had changed some of its members and the intensity of
intra-bloc trade had declined by 1994. The Czech and Slovak Republics are inte-
grated into the functional regions of Western Europe in 1994. This exercise
shows that the selection of the cluster algorithm have an impact upon the analysis,35
but that the conclusions from the hierarchical cluster analysis in the main part of
this paper are largely unaffected.Appendix Figure 3:




























































































































































































































Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ex-Soviet Union and Ex-Yugoslavia.
Asia: Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Burma, Sri Lanka.
'EU (15): without Ireland. -











































































































































































































































































Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ex-Soviet Union and Ex-Yugoslavia.
Asia: Japan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Korea, Hong Kong.
Unweighted average. -
















Sources: International Monetary Fund (1995); own calculations.4O




















































































Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ex-
Soviet Union and Ex-Yugoslavia.
Asia: Japan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia,
Philippines, Korea, Hong Kong.
Conventional: See Table 2.
Scenario I: GNP of the Eastern European Countries is doubled.
Scenario II: GNP of the Eastern European countries is tripled.
Scenario HI: GNP of the Eastern European countries is tripled and GNP of the developing
countries is doubled.
Sources: International Monetary Fund (1995); own calculations.41







































































Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ex-
Soviet Union and Ex-Yugoslavia.
Asia: Japan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia,
Philippines, Korea, Hong Kong.
Conventional: See Appendix Table 2.
Scenario I: GNP of the Eastern European Countries is doubled.
Scenario II: GNP of the Eastern European countries is tripled.
Scenario III: GNP of the Eastern European countries is tripled and GNP of the developing
countries is doubled.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service - International Trade Statistics 1938. - League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service - The Network of World




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1995.